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Payment by Results (PbR) is type of public policy instruments where payments are contingent on the independent verification of results. It is being actively promoted by a number of governments for more effective implementation of domestic policy.〔(UK Cabinet Office, "Open Public Services - White Paper" )〕〔(White House Office of Management and Budget, "Paying for Success" )〕 There is also increasing interest in the field of international development, where PBR is often referred to either as 'results-based aid' (where the funding relationship is between a donor and a recipient country) or 'results-based financing' (where the funding relationship is between a developing country government or a development agency, and public or private sector providers). There are also a number of other terms in use which can often lead to confusion and a lack of clarity.〔ESMAP (2013).("Results-Based Financing in the Energy Sector: An Analytical Guide" ), p.45. The World Bank, Washington, DC〕 PbR instruments have three key features: * Payments for pre-agreed results * Recipient discretion over how the results are achieved * Independent verification as the trigger for disbursement == Domestic policy == There are many cases of PbR models being used to achieve domestic policy goals, in particular the delivery of social or community services, with payments linked to the results a provider achieves, rather than its inputs and processes. The use of PbR models is often promoted as a way to drive service improvements and achieve increased value for money by aligning incentives to desired outcomes. In practice, a diverse range of PbR models have been implemented by Governments, varying by the degree to which: # payments can be based on the achievement of pure outcomes; and # risk can be transferred away from Government and towards providers. The purest form of PbR is Payment by Outcomes, which seeks to maximise payments linked to outcomes. This is where the commissioner (central or local Government) is fully able to contract in terms of the outcomes it wants and to transfer the financial risk of non-delivery to providers. However, commissioners may face a number of challenges that may make a pure Payment by Outcomes approach either impractical or sub-optimal in terms of achieving the aims of PbR models. These challenges largely stem from commissioners’ ability to manage different risks and responsibilities, especially in relation to their understanding of desired outcomes and their measurement. Challenges can include outcomes only being delivered beyond the provider or investor’s return horizon, meaning an earlier payment or proxy outcome must be used; having sufficient confidence that the cash savings used to fund the payment of outcomes will ultimately be realised (e.g. that a reduction in re-offending translates to a reduction in prison capacity); finding a contractual solution that ensures transactional costs are reasonable; and determining how far the delivery of outcomes is attributable to the actual intervention rather than other services or background factors. Commissioners may also find providers are reluctant to accept all of the delivery risk (e.g. where there is a dependency on future Government actions or policies) or where Government cannot truly transfer all of the delivery risk. There are no known cases where all Government services are commissioned out. Furthermore, PbR will not always be the optimal contracting model, especially where in-house delivery is more appropriate, or where greater control is required over the service to be delivered. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Payment by Results」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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